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Abstract—Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that
are executed across a blockchain network. Unlike traditional
programs, once deployed they cannot be modified. As smart
contracts become more popular and carry more value, they
become more of an interesting target for attackers. In recent
years, smart contracts suffered major exploits, costing millions
of dollars, due to programming errors. As a result, a variety of
tools for detecting bugs has been proposed. However, majority
of these tools often yield many false positives due to over-
approximation or poor code coverage due to complex path
constraints. Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a popular and effective
software testing technique. However, traditional fuzzers tend to
be more effective towards finding shallow bugs and less effective
in finding bugs that lie deeper in the execution.
In this work, we present CONFUZZIUS, a hybrid fuzzer that
combines evolutionary fuzzing with constraint solving in order
to execute more code and find more bugs in smart contracts.
Evolutionary fuzzing is used to exercise shallow parts of a smart
contract, while constraint solving is used to generate inputs which
satisfy complex conditions that prevent the evolutionary fuzzing
from exploring deeper paths. Moreover, we use data dependency
analysis to efficiently generate sequences of transactions, that
create specific contract states in which bugs may be hidden. We
evaluate the effectiveness of our fuzzing strategy, by comparing
CONFUZZIUS with state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and
fuzzers. Our evaluation shows that our hybrid fuzzing approach
produces significantly better results than state-of-the-art symbolic
execution tools and fuzzers.
Index Terms—Ethereum, smart contracts, hybrid fuzzing
I. INTRODUCTION
The inception of immutable, blockchain-based smart con-
tracts has shown how to enable multiple mistrusting parties
to trade and interact, without relying on a centralized trusted
third party. The immutability of a contract is crucial: if at
least one of the engaging parties were allowed to modify
a digital contract, the trust in the contract would vanish.
Contrary to traditional legal contracts, smart contracts do not
allow a dispute resolution with the help of a neutral third
party. More importantly, smart contracts are not subject to all-
encompassing legislation — smart contracts hence cannot be
nullified, even if their code figures undeniable software bugs
or vulnerabilities, parties cannot revoke any deployed smart
contract. This very immutability, therefore, comes at a price:
smart contracts must be tested extensively before exposing
them and their users to significant monetary value. In the past,
simple vulnerabilities, such as missing access control [29], as
well as subtle vulnerabilities, such as reentrancy [32], have led
to losses exceeding many tens’ of millions of USD.
Smart contract (and software) testing can be categorized into
four distinct techniques: (i) Unit tests require manual effort
and cover particular contract behavior, which uncovers only a
limited number of bugs within those test-cases. (ii) Symbolic
execution analyzes contract behavior abstractly; however, it
performs slowly on complex contracts (path explosion prob-
lem). (iii) Static analysis does not execute code and over-
approximates the contract behavior — it can, therefore, capture
the entire contract execution surface; however, it exhibits false
positives that must be manually inspected. Finally, (iv) fuzzing
allows testing a contract reasonably fast, with a generally lower
false-positive rate than static testing. Fuzzing, however, can
suffer from low code coverage, especially if input is fuzzed
at random and hence does not overcome simple input sanity
verification.
When analyzing smart contracts, we face three challenges:
1) Input generation: While the possible input space can
be significant, the solution might be limited to a specific
value. For example, if a condition requires an input value
of type uint256 to equate to 42, then the probability of
randomly generating 42 as input is tremendously small.
2) Stateful exploration: Smart contracts are stateful ap-
plications, i.e. the execution may depend on a specific
contract’s state that is only achievable following a spe-
cific sequence of inputs.
3) Environmental dependencies: The runtime environ-
ment of smart contracts, exposes them to additional
inputs related to the underlying blockchain protocol,
such as for example, the current block timestamp or
block number. As a result, the execution flow of smart
contracts may depend on this environmental information.
The first two challenges are commonly faced by traditional
fuzzers and are taken into consideration by current state-of-
the-art smart contract fuzzers [14], [17], [41], while to the
best of our knowledge the third challenge has not yet been
formalized by existing literature on smart contract fuzzing.
We solve the three challenges as follows. Parallel to the
fuzzing procedure, we employ symbolic taint analysis to
generate path constraints. Once we detect that the fuzzer is not
progressing, we activate a constraint solver to solve the path
in question. We collect this solution within a mutation pool,
from which the fuzzer can draw to move past the challeng-
ing contract condition. Existing hybrid fuzzing approaches,
e.g. Driller [35], cease the fuzzer when they are stuck and
switch to concolic execution to get past the complex condition.
Then, they restart the fuzzer once passed the condition. Our
approach keeps the fuzzer running and only makes use of
constraint solving to generate complex inputs that will even-
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tually be picked by the fuzzer through the mutation pools. In
addition to constraint solving, we perform a path termination
analysis to purge irrelevant input from the mutation pools. To
solve the statefulness of smart contracts, we chose to take
advantage of the crossover operator of genetic algorithms.
Genetic algorithms follow three steps: selection, crossover,
and mutation. The crossover operation combines individuals (a
sequence of inputs) to create new individuals. The challenge is
to generate meaningful combinations of inputs. Our crossover
operator is guided by data dependencies between individuals,
and only combines two individuals together if combined they
follow a Read-after-Write data dependency. Finally, in order
to solve the third and last challenge, we instrument the
execution environment (i.e. the Ethereum Virtual Machine),
to fuzz environmental information and model the input to a
contract not only as a transaction but as a tuple, consisting of
transactional data and environmental data.
Contributions. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We propose a novel hybrid fuzzing approach that uses on-
demand constraint solving together with mutation pools
to guide the fuzzer through complex conditions.
• We present a new method based on data dependencies
to create meaningful sequences of inputs that efficiently
fuzz the state of a smart contract.
• We introduce CONFUZZIUS, the first implementation of
a hybrid fuzzer for Ethereum smart contracts.
• We evaluate CONFUZZIUS on a benchmark of real-world
contracts, and demonstrate that it detects more vulnerabil-
ities and achieves significantly more code coverage (14%
more than ILF) than existing tools.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background on Ethereum smart
contracts and hybrid fuzzing.
A. Ethereum Smart Contracts
Smart Contracts. Ethereum [40] enables the execution of
so-called smart contracts. These are fully-fledged programs
that are stored and executed across the Ethereum blockchain,
a network of mutually distrusting nodes. Ethereum supports
two types of accounts, user accounts and contract accounts
(i.e. smart contracts). Smart contracts are different from tra-
ditional programs in many ways. They own a balance and
are identifiable via a 160-bit address. They are developed
using a dedicated high-level programming language, such as
Solidity [39], that compiles into low-level bytecode. This
bytecode gets interpreted by the Ethereum Virtual Machine.
By default, smart contracts cannot be removed or updated
once deployed. It is the task of the developer to implement
these capabilities before deployment. The deployment of smart
contracts as well as the execution of smart contract func-
tions occurs via transactions. The data field of a transaction
includes both, the name of the function to be executed and
its arguments. Transactions are created by user accounts and
afterwards broadcast to the network. They contain a sender and
a recipient. The latter can be the address of a user account or a
contract account. Besides carrying data, transactions may also
carry value.
Ethereum Virtual Machine. The Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) is a purely stack-based, register-less virtual machine
that supports a Turing-complete set of instructions. Although
the instruction set allows for Turing-complete programs, the
capabilities of the instructions are limited to the sole manipu-
lation of the blockchain’s state. The instruction set provides a
variety of operations, ranging from generic operations, such as
arithmetics or control-flow statements, to more specific ones,
such as the modification of a contract’s storage or the querying
of properties related to the transaction (e.g. sender) or the
current blockchain state (e.g. block number). Ethereum makes
use of a gas mechanism to assure the termination of contracts
and to prevent denial-of-service attacks. The gas mechanism
associates costs to the execution of every single instruction.
When issuing a transaction, the sender specifies how much gas
he or she is willing to spend for the execution of the smart
contract. This amount is known as the gas limit. Gas can be
converted to ether (Ethereum’s internal currency) through the
so-called gas price of a transaction. The gas price multiplied
by the gas limit, determines the maximum amount of ether
that the user will be able to pay for the inclusion of his or her
transaction into the blockchain.
B. Hybrid fuzzing
Fuzzing. Fuzz testing, or fuzzing, is an automated software
testing technique that finds vulnerabilities in programs by
feeding malformed or unexpected data as input to programs,
executing them, and monitoring the effects. A fuzzer can
be classified in several ways. It can be generation-based or
mutation-based, depending on whether inputs are generated
from scratch or by modifying existing ones. It can be smart
or dumb, depending on whether it is aware of the structure
of the input or not. Also, a fuzzer can be white-box, grey-
box, or black-box, depending on whether the fuzzer is aware
of the whole program structure, some parts of the program
structure or no program structure. Fuzzing has developed as
one of the most effective approaches to find vulnerabilities in
programs. However, fuzzers often have difficulties in getting
past complex paths conditions contained in programs and
therefore achieve low code coverage.
Symbolic Execution. A popular alternative to fuzzing is sym-
bolic execution. It works by abstractly executing a program,
and supplying and tracking abstract symbols rather than actual
(concrete) values. The execution will then generate symbolic
formulas over the input symbols, which in turn can potentially
be solved by a constraint solver to produce the concrete values.
Symbolic execution is capable of discovering and exploring all
potential paths in a program. However, symbolic execution
is not practically scalable since the number of explorable
1 interface Token {
2 function transferFrom(address sender, address
recipient, uint256 amount) external
returns (bool);
3 function allowance(address owner, address
spender) external view returns (uint256);
4 }
5
6 contract TokenSale {
7 uint256 end = now + 30 days;
8 address wallet = 0x12345678...;
9 Token token = 0xcafebabe...;
10
11 address owner;
12 bool sold;
13
14 function Tokensale() public {
15 owner = msg.sender;
16 }
17
18 function buy() public payable {
19 require(now < end);
20 require(msg.value == 42 ether);
21 sold = true;
22 require(token.transferFrom(this, msg.sender,
token.allowance(wallet, this)));
23 }
24
25 function withdraw() public {
26 require(msg.sender == owner);
27 require(sold);
28 require(now >= end);
29 owner.transfer(address(this).balance);
30 }
31 }
Fig. 1. Example of a vulnerable tokensale smart contract.
paths becomes exponential in more extensive programs (path
explosion problem).
Hybrid Fuzzing. The goal of hybrid fuzzing, or hybrid fuzz
testing, is to take advantage of both worlds. Traditional hybrid
fuzzing starts by performing fuzzing until it saturates, that
is, does not produce any new coverage points after running
some predetermined number of steps. The hybrid fuzzer then
automatically switches to symbolic execution to perform an
exhaustive search for an uncovered coverage point. As soon
as it reaches one, the hybrid fuzzer then reverts to fuzzing.
The interleaving of fuzzing and symbolic execution uses both
the advantage of fuzzing to quickly execute shallow program
paths and the advantage of symbolic execution to explore more
complex program paths.
III. OVERVIEW
In this section, we discuss the three main challenges of
fuzzing smart contracts through a simple motivating example,
and present our approach to solve them.
A. Motivating Example
Suppose a user participated in an initial coin offering (ICO)
on the blockchain and now owns a large number of tokens.
Now assume the user wants to sell a certain amount his
or her tokens at a fixed price to an arbitrary user on the
blockchain. Fig. 1 shows a possible implementation of an
Ethereum smart contract in Solidity, that allows a user to sell
its tokens to an arbitrary user on the Ethereum blockchain.
The idea of the contract is to sell the tokens to the first
buyer that is willing to pay 42 ether within 30 days. The
smart contract acts as a simple mediator for the trade between
the user owning the tokens and the user willing to buy the
tokens. Smart contract based ICOs follow a given standard
that is known as ERC20 [11]. The standard provides an
interface that standardizes function names, parameters, and
return values. For example, the standard includes a function
called transferFrom, that allows a user to transfer a
limited amount of tokens to an arbitrary user on behalf of
the owning user. In our case, it is our smart contract that is
allowed to transfer a specific number of tokens to an arbitrary
user on behalf of the user that is currently wanting to sell its
tokens. Another example is the function allowance, which
returns the remaining number of tokens that a user is allowed
to spend on behalf of the owning user.
The smart contract in Fig. 1 works as follows. An arbitrary
user can call the function buy to purchase the tokens for 42
ether, and the contract will automatically do the transfer of
the tokens by calling the function transferFrom on the
contract of the ICO. Then, after the purchase, the owner of
the smart contract can simply call the function withdraw to
retrieve the 42 ether of the purchase. However, the contract
contains two vulnerabilities, one known as block dependency
and another one known as leaking ether. The first vulnerability
occurs when the transfer of ether depends on block informa-
tion, such as the timestamp (see line 28 in Fig. 1). Malicious
miners can alter the timestamp of their blocks, especially if
they can gain advantages by doing so. Although miners cannot
set the timestamp smaller than the previous one, nor can they
set the timestamp too far ahead in the future, developers should
still refrain from writing contracts where the transfer of ether
depends on block information. The second vulnerability occurs
whenever a contract allows an arbitrary user to transfer ether,
despite the user having never transferred ether to the contract
before. The following sequence of transactions triggers both
vulnerabilities:
• t0: A non-malicious user calls the function buy with a
value equals to 42 ether;
• t1: An attacker calls the function Tokensale;
• t2: The same attacker calls the function withdraw after
30 days.
The two vulnerabilities are enabled through a bug (see line
14 in Fig. 1) in the function Tokensale. Before Solidity
version 0.4.22, the only way of defining a constructor was
to create a function with the same name as the contract.
The function Tokensale is supposed to be the constructor
of the contract TokenSale. However, due to a typo in
the function name, the contract name and function name do
not match, and therefore the compiler does not consider the
function as being the constructor of the contract. As a result,
the function Tokensale is considered a normal function
require(now < end);
require(msg.value == 42 ether); REVERT
sold = true; 
require(token.transferFrom(this,    
msg.sender,   
token.allowance(wallet,  
this)
)
);
REVERT
REVERTSTOP
now < end now >= end
msg.value == 42 ether msg.value != 42 ether
token.transferFrom(…) == True token.transferFrom(…) == False
Fig. 2. Control-flow graph of the function buy(), where the complex
condition msg.value == 42 ether is highlighted in red.
that is callable by any user on the blockchain. This type
of programming mistake has led to multiple attacks in the
past [1]. When running the above example using, ILF [14]
(an imitation learning based smart contract fuzzer), it is not
capable of finding the two vulnerabilities even after 1 hour.
Inspecting the code coverage reveals that ILF achieves only
53%. For comparison, CONFUZZIUS achieves roughly 97%
code coverage and correctly identifies the two vulnerabilities
in less than 5 seconds.
B. Input Generation
Generating meaningful inputs is crucial for automated soft-
ware testing. Fuzzers randomly generate new inputs in order
to execute not-yet-executed code. This generation can be
completely random (black-box fuzzers) or driven by runtime
information (grey-box fuzzers). In both cases, the primary
approach is to mutate previous values in order to generate
new values to test. Thus, finding the right heuristics is of
fundamental importance to efficiently explore the target input
space and, eventually, find latent bugs in the code. However,
real-world programs tend to contain conditions that are hard
to trigger. These complex conditions need to be addressed by
fuzzers in order to execute as much code as possible. Line 20
in Fig. 1 gives an example of a complex condition. Function
buy requires the transaction value to be equals to 42 ether.
Fig. 2 illustrates the control-flow graph (CFG) of the function
buy. The complex condition is highlighted in red in the CFG.
A fuzzer following a traditional random strategy will fail to
get past this condition since it will generate the value 42 only
once every 2256 trials.
Existing smart contract fuzzers such as HARVEY [41] instru-
ment the code and compute cost metrics for every branch to
mutate the inputs. Our approach applies constraint solving to
generate values for complex conditions on-demand. However,
the fuzzer does not directly propagate these values, but instead,
it stores them in so-called mutation pools. Mutation pools
manage a set of values that the fuzzer can use to get past
complex conditions. Every function has a mutation pool per
function argument and input field (e.g. transaction value or
transaction sender). Initially, all the pools are empty and
the fuzzer uses randomly generated inputs to feed the target
functions. Once the fuzzer is not able to discover new paths, it
activates the constraint solver in order to generate new values.
Symbolic taint analysis creates the expressions required by
the constraint solver in order to generate new values. We
introduce taint in the form of a symbolic value whenever we
come across an input during execution. This symbolic value is
then propagated throughout the program execution, forming a
symbolic expression that reflects the constraints on the input.
Solving these expressions will result in new values that are
added to the mutation pools. The fuzzer will then use these
values when available for the specific function arguments, to
generate new inputs that execute new paths. In Fig. 1, once
CONFUZZIUS realizes that the code coverage is not increasing,
it activates the constraint solver, which outputs the value 42
and adds it to the mutation pool of the first argument of
function buy. Eventually, the value will be picked up by the
fuzzer in the next round, and the execution of the transaction
will evaluate the condition at line 20 to True, which results
in getting past the missing branch and executing new lines of
code.
C. Stateful Exploration
Due to the transactional nature of blockchains, smart con-
tract fuzzers must take into consideration that each transaction
may have a different output depending on the current state
of the contract, i.e. all the previously executed transactions.
Appropriately combining multiple transactions is necessary
in order to generate states that trigger the execution of new
branches. Ethereum smart contracts have, besides a volatile
memory model, also a persistent memory model called stor-
age that allows them to keep state across transactions. For
example, the global variables end, wallet, token, owner,
and sold in Fig. 1 are storage variables and their values
might change across transactions. Let us consider the two
vulnerabilities mentioned earlier. An attacker will only be
able to extract the funds via the function withdraw, if the
two variables owner and sold are equals to the address of
the attacker and True, respectively. However, this is only
the case if the functions buy and Tokensale are called
before. Thus only a combination of the three transactions will
be able to trigger the vulnerabilities. Although this case may
seem simple, automatically finding the right combination of
transactions within contracts with a large number of functions
can become very challenging as the number of possible
combinations grows exponentially.
We base our solution on a simple observation: a transaction
influences the output of a subsequent set of transactions if
and only if, it modifies a storage variable that one of the
following transactions is going to use. This property is a
known data dependency called Read-after-Write (RAW) [15].
CONFUZZIUS traces all the storage reads and writes performed
by a transaction along with the storage locations. Afterwards,
it tries to combine transactions that read from a particular
Tokensale()
1) Write: owner1) Read: end
2) Write: sold
…
1) Read: owner
2) Read: sold
…
buy() withdraw()
Fig. 3. A dependency graph illustrating the Read-after-Write (RAW) depen-
dencies contained in Fig. 1. A node represents a smart contract function and
an edge indicates a RAW dependency between two functions.
storage location after another transaction writes to the same
storage location. The fuzzer always executes the combination
of transactions on a clean state of the contract. By construction,
a transaction sequence contains only transactions that change
the state used by one of the subsequent transactions within the
same sequence. In the example of Fig. 1, CONFUZZIUS will
progressively learn that:
• buy reads variable end and writes to variable sold;
• Tokensale writes to variable owner;
• withdraw reads variable owner and variable sold.
Using the information learned above and combining trans-
actions based on RAW dependencies, CONFUZZIUS will even-
tually create the following transaction sequence:
buy() → Tokensale() → withdraw()
The directed graph in Fig. 3 presents the RAW dependencies
to generate all the possible combinations. The graph shows
that the functions buy and Tokensale must be executed
before the function withdraw, but that the order between
the two can be arbitrary.
D. Environmental Dependencies
The execution of a smart contract does not only depend
on the transaction arguments or the contract’s current state.
The control-flow of a smart contract can also depend on
input originating from the execution environment (e.g. block’s
timestamp). Let us consider the contract in Fig. 1. Even though
the function withdraw has no input argument, the transfer of
the balance is bound to some requirements. The requirement
at line 28 is only satisfied if the transaction triggering the
function call is part of a block that was created 30 days after
the deployment of the contract. Thus, the condition is bound
to the mining mechanism of the Ethereum blockchain. While
users submit transactions to the blockchain, miners aggregate
them into blocks and distribute them to other nodes upon
validation. When executing the transactions included in the
block, the EVM accesses the block information contained
therein. Block information includes the hash of the block,
the miner’s address, the block timestamp, the block number,
the block difficulty, and the block gas limit. We solve this
challenge by modelling this information as a fuzzable input.
These inputs follow the same fuzzing procedure as transaction
inputs. We had to modify the EVM in order to inject the fuzzed
block information during the execution of the smart contract.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we provide details on the overall design and
implementation of CONFUZZIUS.
A. Overview
CONFUZZIUS’s architecture is divided into two main parts:
the evolutionary fuzzing engine and the execution trace an-
alyzer. Figure 4 provides a high-level overview of CON-
FUZZIUS’s architecture and depicts its different components.
CONFUZZIUS has been implemented in Python with roughly
6,000 lines of code1. CONFUZZIUS takes as input the source
code of a smart contract, and a blockchain state. The later
is in the form of a list of transactions and is optional. The
blockchain state is convenient for fuzzing already deployed
smart contracts or contracts that need to be initialized with a
specific state. CONFUZZIUS begins by compiling the smart
contract in order to obtain the Application Binary Inter-
face (ABI) and the EVM runtime bytecode. Afterwards, the
evolutionary fuzzing engine starts by generating an initial
population of individuals, based on the smart contract’s ABI.
After that, the engine follows a standard genetic algorithm (i.e.
selection, crossover and mutation) and propagates the newly
generated individuals to the instrumented EVM. The instru-
mented EVM then executes these individuals and forwards the
resulting execution traces to the execution trace analyzer. Next,
the execution trace analyzer performs a number of analyses,
such as symbolic taint analysis or data dependency analysis,
from the execution traces that it received. Moreover, the
execution trace analyzer is also responsible for triggering the
constraint solver, running the vulnerability detectors, as well
as maintaining the mutation pools, and feeding information
related to code coverage and data dependencies to the evolu-
tionary fuzzing engine. This process is repeated until at least
one of the two termination conditions is met: a given number
of generations has been created, or a given number of seconds
has passed. Finally, CONFUZZIUS outputs a report containing
information about the code coverage and the vulnerabilities
that it detected.
B. Evolutionary Fuzzing Engine
The evolutionary fuzzing engine is one of the main compo-
nents of our hybrid fuzzing system. Evolutionary fuzzing aims
at converging towards the discovery of vulnerabilities by using
a genetic algorithm (GA), to produce successive generations of
test cases. A generation of test cases is defined as a population,
whereas a single test case is defined as an individual. In
short, every individual of a generation is evaluated based on
a fitness function. At the end of each generation, solely the
fittest individuals are allowed to breed, thus following the
idea of natural selection, also known as Darwinism or the
”survival of the fittest”. Eventually, the individuals will trigger
vulnerabilities while converging towards an optimal solution.
In the following, we briefly describe the main steps that a
typical GA follows (see Algorithm 1).
1The source code will be publicly available under an open-source license.
Initial Population
Instrumented EVM
Constraint Solving
Termination Analysis
Data Dependency Analysis
Code Coverage Evaluation
Vulnerability Detection
Symbolic Taint Analysis
Evolutionary Fuzzing Engine Execution Trace Analyzer
Mutation Pools
Data Dependencies
Execution TraceIndividual
Read Value
Remove Value
Report
Smart 
Contract
Blockchain State
(Optional)
Code Coverage
ConFuzzius
Add Value
Selection
Crossover
Mutation
Fig. 4. Overview of CONFUZZIUS’s hybrid fuzzing architecture.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-Code of a Genetic Algorithm
1: Create initial population and compute its fitness
2: Set initial population as current population
3: while termination condition is not met do
4: while new population < current population do
5: Select two parents from current population
6: Recombine parents to create two new offsprings
7: Mutate offsprings and add them to new population
8: end while
9: Compute fitness of new population
10: Replace current population with new population
11: Create a new empty population
12: end while
We start by creating an initial population of individuals, that
are either generated at random or seeded via heuristics, and
compute their fitness values (line 1). Then, based on the fitness,
we select two individuals from the current population, which
act as parents for breading (line 5). Afterwards, we apply
crossover and mutation operators on the parents to generate
two new individuals, also denoted as offsprings (lines 6-7).
The generation of new individuals continues until the new
population reaches the same size of the current one (line 4).
Then, the fitness values of the new computation are computed
and we replace the current population by the new population
(lines 9-10). The whole process continues until a termination
condition is met (line 3), e.g. the maximum number of
generations is reached or a maximum amount of time has
passed. In the following, we provide details on the encoding,
initialization, fitness evaluation, selection, combination, and
mutation of individuals.
Encoding Individuals. One of the most important decisions to
make while implementing an evolutionary fuzzer, is deciding
on the representation of the individuals. It has been observed
that the improper encoding of individuals can lead to a poor
performance [21]. Figure 5 illustrates our encoding of indi-
viduals. Vulnerabilities are usually triggered either by sending
a single transaction or a sequence of transactions to a smart
contract. However, transactions alone are not enough to trig-
ger vulnerabilities (see Section III-D). Certain vulnerabilities
depend on the execution environment to be in a specific state.
For this reason, our encoding represents an individual as a
sequence of inputs, where every input consists of an environ-
ment and a transaction. Both are represented via a key-value
mapping. The environment includes the current timestamp and
block number. The transaction includes the address of the
sending account (from), the transaction amount (value), the
maximum amount of gas for the contract to execute (gas limit)
and the input data for the contract to execute (data). The input
data is represented as an array of values where the first element
is always the function selector and the remaining elements
represent the function arguments. The function selector is
computed using the ABI and extracting the first four bytes
of the Keccak (SHA-3) hash of the function signature. As
an example, the function test(string a, uint b), has
the string test(string,uint) as its function signature, which
after hashing and extracting the first four bytes, results in
0x7d6cdd25 being its function selector.
Initial Population. The population is initialized with N
individuals, each of which initially contains only a single
input. The function selector to be included in the transaction
is selected in a round-robin fashion. Function arguments are
generated based on their type, which we obtain through the
ABI. Depending on the type and size (i.e. fixed or non-fixed)
of the argument, we apply different strategies to generate valid
arguments for each function. For example, if the argument
type is a fixed size uint32, then we randomly choose a
value either from the valid input domain (e.g. between 0 and
232 − 1) or from a set of inputs that trigger edge cases of
the valid input domain (e.g. 0, 1, 4294967295, etc.). The
population is reinitialized whenever there has been no increase
in terms of code coverage for the past k generations. This
introduces back diversity and helps procrastinating premature
convergence when the population has become homogeneous.
Fitness Evaluation. The fitness evaluation of individuals plays
a crucial role in evolutionary fuzzing. The computation of
the fitness function is done repeatedly and must be therefore
0x7d6cdd25 “hello” 42
Function Selector String uint32
Timestamp 1533907326
Population
Input
Individual
Environment
Transaction
Block Number
From
Value
Gas Limit
1000000
0xdeadbeef…
100
Data
3000000
Fig. 5. Encoding of our population and its individuals. The shadowed boxes represent immutable values, whereas the non-shadowed boxes represent values
that are mutable.
sufficiently fast. A slow computation can adversely make the
fuzzing exceptionally slow. The fitness function is supposed
to represent the landscape of the problem. In general, evolu-
tionary fuzzers aim to achieve complete coverage of the code.
While obtaining full code coverage does not necessarily mean
that all vulnerabilities will be found, it is certainly true that
no vulnerabilities will be found in code that has not been
explored. Our fitness function is based on branch coverage (a
form of code coverage) and data dependencies. We define our
fitness function for an individual i as follows:
fit(i) = fitbranch(i) + fitwrite(i) (1)
The fitness fitbranch is computed by counting the number
of branches that remain unexplored by the individual. In
order to compute this number, we keep track of all the
branches that have been executed so far by all the individuals.
Then, we iterate through the execution trace of the individual
and analyze every conditional jump instruction (i.e. JUMPI
instruction). A conditional jump has always two destinations,
one for the True branch and one for the False branch. We
obtain the jump destination of the True branch by extracting
it from the stack, and the jump destination of the False
branch by increasing the program counter by one. We increase
the individual’s fitness value fitbranch by 10 for every jump
destination that is not in our list of executed branches. The idea
behind this approach is to give individuals that require more
exploration a high fitness, since these individuals will allow us
to explore new parts of the contract. However, this metric alone
is not enough, since we are also interested in preserving indi-
viduals that allow us to create useful sequences of transactions
(e.g. sequences with Read-after-Write dependencies), although
they may have been already explored extensively. Therefore,
we compute the fitness fitwrite, which takes this into account
by using the data dependencies detected by our analyzer. We
start with a fitwrite of 0 and add a value of 1 for every write to
storage that the individual has performed during execution. By
adding 1 instead of 10, we put less importance on the fitness
fitwrite and put more importance on fitbranch. Ultimately,
it is the combination of the two that allows us to drive the
genetic algorithm towards the exploration of unexplored code.
Thus, the final fitness of an individual is the sum of fitbranch
and fitwrite.
Selection. The process of choosing two individuals for the
crossover step is called selection. A number of selection
operators has been proposed in literature [34]. We choose
linear ranking selection as our selection operator, since it
considers the whole population during selection and not just a
subset as it is for example the case in tournament selection. In
linear ranking selection, individuals with high fitness values
will be ranked high and those with low fitness values will
eventually have lower ranks. Then the individuals are selected
with a probability that is linearly proportional to the rank of
the individuals in the population. In other words, the worst
individual has a rank of 1, the second-worst a rank of 2, etc.
The best performing individual has a rank of N , where N is
the size of the population. This results in all the individuals
having a chance of being selected, although the higher-ranked
individuals will be slightly preferred. After having selected the
two individuals, we propagate them to the crossover operator.
Crossover. The purpose of our crossover operator is to create
two new individuals by recombining the input sequences of
two existing individuals. Instead of randomly combining two
individuals together, we combine two individuals only if one
individual performs a write to a storage location from which
the other individual performs a read (also know as read-after-
write dependency). There are only two possible combinations,
individual a combined with individual b, or vice versa. If a
combination yields a read-after-write relation, then we com-
bine both individuals by first selecting the individual whose
input sequence performs the write and then appending the in-
dividual whose input sequence performs the read. This results
in concatenating individuals, rather than splitting them apart
and swapping their input sequences. This way we preserve the
read-after-write relations within the individuals themselves and
create individuals with new read-after-write relations. If there
is no relation between two individuals, then we simply return
one of the two individuals unmodified. However, it should be
noted that individuals are not always combined even though
they might have a read-after-write relation. Individuals are
combined based on a given crossover probability pc. Moreover,
to prevent individuals from growing indefinitely large, we
check before combining, if the sum of their length exceeds
a maximum size l, and only combine them if the sum of their
length is lower or equals to l.
Mutation. The mutation randomly modifies parts of a single
individual, in order to create a new individual. Mutation is used
to introduce diversity in the population. Our mutation operator
works by iterating through the sequence of inputs of an
individual, and mutating every environmental and transnational
value based on a given mutation probability pm. A value can
be mutated in two ways, either by replacing the original value
with a random one, or by replacing the original value with
a value from a mutation pool. Mutation pools act as a form
of short-term memory. They allow the fuzzer to reuse values
that have been previously observed or learned during past
executions. There are in total six different mutation pools, one
per transactional and environmental value. Thus, our fuzzer
has a mutation pool for senders, amounts, gas limits, function
arguments, timestamps and block numbers. All mutation pools
are implemented as a mapping of a function selector and
a circular buffer, except for the mutation pool on function
arguments. The implementation is similar, except that we do
not directly map the function selector to a circular buffer, but
to another mapping that maps to an argument index, and only
then to a circular buffer. Thus, the pool for function arguments,
first maps to a function selector, then to an argument index,
and then to a circular buffer. This is because functions can
have more than just one argument and we want to keep track
of interesting values for every argument separately. Circular
buffers help us ensure that the values contained therein are
rotated in a round-robin like fashion and that old values
are overwritten by newer ones (i.e. mimicking short-term
memory). Our buffers can hold by default up to 10 values.
The mutation pools are initially all empty, except for the
mutation pool tracking the amounts, which gets initialized
with the values 0 and 1. When mutating a transactional or
environmental value, we first check if the associated mutation
pool is empty. If the pool is empty, then we inject a randomly
generated value based on the type information extracted from
the ABI. Otherwise, we inject the current value contained at
the head of the circular buffer and rotate the buffer.
C. Instrumented EVM
The EVM is responsible for executing the transactions
generated by the individuals on the runtime bytecode of the
contract that is under test. Its efficiency has a significant impact
on the overall performance of the fuzzer. Hence, the EVM
must achieve a high processing rate of transactions. Every
official Ethereum client implementation provides the capability
to deploy a smart contract locally and send transactions to it.
However, all of these clients require transactions to be mined
and passed via a JSON-RPC interface or being encoded using
the Recursive Length Prefix (RLP) format. The actual EVM
execution time is negligible compared to the effort that it takes
to encode and decode a transaction to and from the RLP
format. So instead, we decided to reuse an existing official
Python implementation of the EVM [10], and reuse it within
our fuzzer. This removes the burden from mining blocks as
well as encoding transactions, and thus significantly speeds
up the execution. Moreover, we slightly modified the EVM in
order to be able to retrieve the execution trace. An execution
trace consists of an array, where every element contains the
name of the executed instruction, the program counter, the
execution stack, the call-stack depth and a flag stating if
an internal error occurred during execution. The EVM itself
is by default stateless and uses the blockchain to preserve
states. However, since we are not interested in the internal
mechanisms of the Ethereum blockchain, we implemented
a simple storage emulator that is used by our EVM, in
order to preserve the state changes that are performed during
execution. All state changes are kept in memory to further
improve the speed of execution. Besides preserving the state of
smart contracts, the storage emulator also allows us to modify
environmental information such as the block number or the
block timestamp. Moreover, the storage emulator also allows
us to create snapshots of the current state of the EVM. This
enables us to quickly reset the state of the EVM to an initial
state, without having to redeploy the smart contract every time
from scratch when executing the transactions of an individual.
D. Execution Trace Analyzer
The execution trace analyzer performs a variety of analyses
from the execution trace obtained by the instrumented EVM.
The analyses include, code coverage evaluation, data depen-
dency analysis, symbolic taint analysis, vulnerability detection,
constraint solving, and termination analysis. In addition to that,
it also manages the values stored within the mutation pools and
provides the information required by the evolutionary fuzzing
engine to compute the fitness and perform the crossover of
individuals. Finally, it is also responsible for generating a
report containing statistics about the code coverage and the
vulnerabilities that have been found.
Code Coverage Evaluation. Code coverage is not only
necessary for computing the fitness of individuals, but also for
detecting when the evolutionary fuzzing engine gets “stuck”,
and constraint solving should be applied. The code coverage is
computed by counting the number of unique program counter
values contained within the execution trace.
Data Dependency Analysis. The fitness evaluation as well
as the crossover operator require information about data de-
pendencies. The data dependency analysis returns an object
consisting of two sets, one containing all the storage indexes
that have been read from, and another one containing all the
storage indexes that have been written to. We retrieve these
indexes by iterating through the execution trace and checking
for SLOAD and SSTORE instructions. We extract for both
instructions the storage index from the stack and add them
to the respective set, i.e. indexes from an SLOAD are added to
the set of reads, whereas indexes from an SSTORE are added
to the set of writes.
Symbolic Taint Analysis. The purpose of our symbolic taint
analysis is to produce symbolic constraints that are later
useful for other components such as constraint solving and
vulnerability detection. We introduce symbolic values and
track their flow between instructions. We leverage light dy-
namic taint analysis by injecting taint only whenever we come
across instructions that can be fuzzed, such as for example
CALLDATALOAD, CALLVALUE or TIMESTAMP. The taint is
propagated throughout the interpretation of the execution trace
along with the value that was assigned to it. We faithfully
propagate taint across stack and memory, and storage. The
propagation of taint across storage allows us to do inter-
transactional taint analysis. We implemented the stack using an
array structure that follows LIFO logic. To represent memory
and storage, we simply used a Python dictionary that maps
memory and storage addresses to values. As the EVM is
a stack-based and register-less virtual machine, as such the
operands of instructions are always passed via the stack.
Therefore, our taint propagation method identifies the operands
of each EVM bytecode instruction and propagates the taint
according to the semantics of each instruction as defined
in [40]. The taint propagation logic follows an over-tainting
policy, which simply tags the output of an instruction as tainted
if at least one of the inputs of the instruction are tainted.
Constraint Solving. There are situations where the evolution-
ary fuzzing engine converges since it is not able to advance
past a particular condition. We often say that the landscape has
become flat. The role of the constraint solver is to generate a
valid input that allows the evolutionary fuzzing engine to get
past the complex condition. The symbolic taint analysis tries
to build a logical formula that describes the execution path of
an execution trace, thereby reducing the problem of reasoning
about the execution to the domain of logic. These logical
formulas are often called path constraints. We implemented
our own light weight symbolic execution engine, that only ex-
ecutes instructions related to arithmetic operations (e.g. ADD,
MOD, EXP), comparison logic (e.g. LT, EQ) and bitwise logic
(e.g. AND, NOT). The engine consists of an interpreter loop that
gets instructions from the execution trace and symbolically
executes them. The loop continues until all the instructions
contained in the execution trace have been executed. As a
result, we obtain a logical formula for the current execution
trace. To produce a valid input that satisfies the complex
condition, we simply negate the last condition contained in
the logical formula, substitute the symbolic variables in the
rest of the logical formula with concrete values that have been
used as input to trigger the execution trace, and use the Z3
SMT solver [9] to produce a solution. Concretization helps us
reduce the complexity of the formula and therefore alleviate
the path explosion problem. The solution is then added to a
mutation pool, along with the previous solution that was not
capable of triggering the other part of the branch. Eventually,
in one of the following generations, the mutation operator will
pick up the new solution and our evolutionary fuzzing engine
will now be able to get past the complex condition.
Termination Analysis. The execution traces may contain
valuable feedback on the validity of the inputs generated by the
fuzzer. Our fuzzer makes use of the execution traces as a way
to obtain feedback and to learn which inputs are meaningful
and which are not. The goal of our termination analysis is to
inspect the execution traces for opcodes that indicate either
correct or incorrect termination of an execution. Invalid inputs
will result in the execution trace terminating with a REVERT,
INVALID or ASSERTFAIL instruction, whereas valid inputs
will result in the execution terminating with either a STOP or
RETURN instruction. If we detect that an execution terminates
incorrectly, then we analyze the last path condition before
the termination and infer from the symbolic values which
inputs are responsible for the termination. We then remove
the responsible input values from the the respective mutation
pools, since mutating using input values that result in an
incorrect termination will prevent the fuzzer from exploring
deeper parts of the code.
Vulnerability Detection. We detect vulnerabilities by analyz-
ing the execution traces and using the information returned by
the different components, such as the symbolic taint analysis
or the data dependency analysis. We define a detector per
vulnerability and currently implement 11 different detectors:
arbitrary memory access, assertion failure, integer overflow,
reentrancy, transaction order dependency, block dependency,
unhandled exception, unsafe delegatecall, leaking ether, lock-
ing ether, and unprotected selfdestruct. A detailed explanation
on the implementation of each vulnerability detector is pro-
vided in Appendix A. The detection capabilities of our fuzzer
can easily be extended by simply adding more detectors.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide details on the benchmark we
used and explain our experimental setup. Then, we compare
CONFUZZIUS to two current state-of-the-art fuzzers as well
as three symbolic execution tools for smart contracts and
asses the effectiveness and performance of CONFUZZIUS
by answering two research questions. Finally, we highlight
potential threats to the validity of our evaluation.
A. Dataset
We performed our evaluation using the benchmark proposed
by Wu¨stholz et al. [41]. The benchmark consists of 27 real-
world open-source smart contracts collected from 17 different
GitHub repositories. The repositories have been selected based
on their popularity on GitHub and among the Ethereum
community (e.g. Ethereum Name Service, ConsenSys multi-
sig wallet, MicroRaiden payment service). Furthermore, the
benchmark also includes contracts that have been hacked in
the past or are known to be malicious or buggy (e.g. The
TABLE I
SECURITY ANALYSIS TOOLS EVALUATED IN THIS WORK. TOOLS MARKED WITH  SUPPORT THE VULNERABILITY DETECTOR, WHILE TOOLS MARKED
WITH # DO NOT SUPPORT THE VULNERABILITY DETECTOR. TOOLS MARKED WITH G# CLAIM TO SUPPORT THE DETECTOR BUT CANNOT BE VERIFIED.
Toolname Type Open-Source Requires ABI Vulnerability DetectorsAM AF IO RE TD BD UE UD LE LO US
HARVEY [41] Fuzzer 7 7   G# G# # # G# # # # #
ILF [14] Fuzzer 3 3 # # # # #       
OYENTE [22] Symbolic 3 7 #      # # # #  
MYTHRIL [26] Symbolic 3 7     #     #  
MANTICORE [28] Symbolic 3 7 #         #  
DAO, Parity wallet, and USCC2). Moreover, the authors affirm
that they followed the guidelines on evaluating fuzzers when
selecting the smart contracts [19]. Table V in Appendix B,
provides an overview of the 27 selected contracts. The first
column lists the benchmark IDs and the second column, the
project acronym. The third and fourth columns show the
number of public functions and the lines of source code
(LoSC), respectively. Finally, the last column provides a small
description of the project. The benchmark is very diverse, as
it contains contracts ranging from 57 LoSC up to 3065 LoSC.
B. Experimental Setup
We followed the published guidelines by Klees et al. [19]
on evaluating fuzz testing. For each experiment, we performed
24 runs, each with independent seeds and a time limit of
1 hour per run. The experiments were carried out using
our high-performance computing infrastructure. We run our
experiments on ten different nodes with 128 GB of memory.
Every node is running CentOS Linux release 7.6.1810 and
has 2 Intel® Xeon® Gold 6132 CPUs with 14 cores, each
clocked at 2.60 GHz. We run CONFUZZIUS with a population
size that is double the number of functions contained in the
ABI of the respective contract that is under test. Moreover,
we set the probability of crossover and the probability of
mutation, to 0.9 and 0.1, respectively. Further, we set the
number of generations to be held before reinitializing the
population to 10 and the maximum length for the individuals
to 5. We used Z3, version 4.8.5, as our constraint solver with
a timeout of 100 milliseconds per Z3 request. We compare
CONFUZZIUS to the security tools listed in Table I. We
selected two advanced smart contract fuzzers (HARVEY and
ILF), and three popular open-source symbolic execution tools
for smart contacts (OYENTE v0.2.7, MYTHRIL v0.21.20 and
MANTICORE v0.3.2). Although HARVEY is not open-source
at the time of writing, by using the benchmark provided by
Wu¨stholz et al. [41] we can compare ourselves and other tools
to HARVEY. Both ILF and CONFUZZIUS require the ABI as
input in order to be able to fuzz the contract under test. Finally,
Table I also compares the different types of vulnerabilities
detected by each of the tools. CONFUZZIUS implements a
total of 11 vulnerability detectors. From the comparison in
Table I we can see that none of the analyzed security tools
is able to detect all of the 11 vulnerabilities that are currently
detectable by CONFUZZIUS.
2Underhanded Solidity Coding Contest – https://u.solidity.cc/
C. Experimental Results
RQ1: Does CONFUZZIUS achieve higher code cover-
age than state-of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic execution
tools?
Comparing to Fuzzers. We start by comparing CONFUZZIUS
to HARVEY, a grey-box fuzzer for smart contracts. HARVEY
uses input prediction and demand-driven sequence fuzzing
to test smart contracts efficiently. We report the instruction
coverage for the 27 real-world contracts in Table II. HARVEY
is not open-source, and the results listed here are taken directly
from the paper [41]. CONFUZZIUS outperforms HARVEY in
21 contracts out of the 27 (i.e. about 78% of the cases).
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Fig. 6. Instruction coverage of CONFUZZIUS and ILF.
Next, we compare CONFUZZIUS to ILF, a fuzzer based on
imitation learning. ILF uses neural networks to learn a fuzzing
policy from a dataset of inputs generated by a symbolic execu-
tion expert. We evaluate ILF on the HARVEY benchmark and
perform the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test [23] to determine
if the differences in the results are statistically significant. We
report the instruction coverage and p-values for the results
on the 27 real-world contracts in Table IV in Appendix F.
Traditionally, p-values below 0.05 are considered good enough
to show a statistically significant difference between the two
populations. However, p-values alone are not sufficient to
draw throughout statistical conclusions, since they say nothing
about the extent of divergence, also known as the effect size.
Therefore, we also compute Vargha Delaney’s A measure [38],
which computes the effect size. Intuitively these show the
probability of a tool a being better than a tool b, and vice
versa. We report the Vargha-Delaney effect sizes in Table IV
(AILF,CONFUZZIUS and ACONFUZZIUS,ILF). Our results show that
for 24 out of the 27 contracts (i.e. about 89% of the cases),
CONFUZZIUS achieves significantly higher code coverage than
ILF. Fig. 6 illustrates the median instruction coverage of
CONFUZZIUS and ILF across the HARVEY benchmark, for
a number of 5K transactions. For the first 500 transactions
ILF performs slightly better than CONFUZZIUS. However,
from 500 transactions onwards ILF starts converging and
CONFUZZIUS consistently outperforms ILF. CONFUZZIUS
achieves 88% code coverage, 14% higher than ILF. We
analyzed the contracts where CONFUZZIUS achieves low
coverage compared to both, HARVEY and ILF. We conclude
that these contracts require transaction sequences where their
inputs need to be consistent throughout the sequence. CON-
FUZZIUS’s constraint solving approach is currently not able
to detect this dependency and will generate inputs randomly.
HARVEY and ILF generate inputs from a limited set of values,
eventually reusing the same inputs across transactions.
Comparing to Symbolic Executors. Table III presents the
instruction coverage for CONFUZZIUS, OYENTE, MYTHRIL
and MANTICORE for the HARVEY benchmark. The cases
in which one tool is performing better than the other differ
tremendously, which makes it hard to compare to one another
and draw any conclusions. Moreover, we do not want to
compare CONFUZZIUS to every symbolic executor separately,
but rather all together. Therefore, to evaluate which tool is
performing better overall, we employ Copeland’s method [31].
Copeland’s method is a Condorcet voting method in which
candidates are ordered based on the number of pairwise
victories minus the number of pairwise defeats. Table VI
in Appendix C shows the victories and defeats for all the
possible pairwise combinations of the four tools. For example,
we determine the winner of the pairwise comparison between
OYENTE and MYTHRIL by counting the cases in which
OYENTE achieves higher instruction coverage than MYTHRIL,
and vice versa. This results in 7 cases where OYENTE performs
better vs. 20 cases where MYTHRIL performs better. Thus, the
winner of this pairwise comparison is MYTHRIL. Now, we
can compute the ranking by subtracting the number of defeats
from the number of victories. Table VII in Appendix D shows
the number of victories, defeats, and the ranking for the four
tools. The overall winner is CONFUZZIUS with 3 victories
and 0 defeats. MYTHRIL is ranked second with 2 victories
and 1 defeat, then OYENTE is ranked third with 1 victory and
2 defeats, and finally, MANTICORE is ranked fourth with 0
victories and 3 defeats.
Result. CONFUZZIUS achieves higher code coverage than
current state-of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic execution tools
with statistical significance.
RQ2: Does CONFUZZIUS find more vulnerabilities than
state-of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic execution tools?
TABLE II
INSTRUCTION COVERAGE COMPARISON BETWEEN HARVEY AND
CONFUZZIUS.
BID HARVEY CONFUZZIUS Ratio Total
1 3868.0 3105.0 0.80 10001
2 4005.5 4936.0 1.23 5212
3 3487.0 4562.0 1.31 4767
4 3773.0 5052.5 1.34 5335
5 3501.0 4635.5 1.32 4890
6 1949.0 2330.0 1.20 2631
7 1524.0 1587.0 1.04 1658
8 2205.0 2561.0 1.16 2934
9 3468.0 3627.0 1.05 4109
10 7360.5 6748.0 0.92 8573
11 8716.0 8893.5 1.02 19066
12 5165.0 4303.0 0.83 24303
13 4510.0 3417.5 0.76 12293
14 4655.0 3783.0 0.81 9400
15 5078.5 5086.5 1.00 6208
16 496.0 505.0 1.02 752
17 2754.0 3072.0 1.12 3077
18 2930.0 2419.0 0.83 2715
19 2611.0 3345.0 1.28 8164
20 3018.0 3157.0 1.05 3243
21 434.0 447.0 1.03 448
22 1274.0 1309.0 1.03 1317
23 2095.0 2149.0 1.03 3962
24 754.0 939.0 1.25 946
25 1192.0 1347.0 1.13 1351
26 1606.0 4486.0 2.79 5034
27 5499.5 7752.0 1.41 8492
Median 3018.0 3539.0 1.14 5959
Comparing to Fuzzers. Fig. 7 depicts the number of true
and false positives on the HARVEY benchmark reported by
CONFUZZIUS and the security tools analyzed in this work.
We manually analyzed the results reported by each tool
and checked for true and false positives per contract. When
comparing CONFUZZIUS to HARVEY, we see that CON-
FUZZIUS identifies the same number of arbitrary memory
access vulnerabilities, but fails to detect one assertion failure
vulnerability. We assume that this is due to CONFUZZIUS
achieving lower code coverage than HARVEY on one of the
contracts, which results in CONFUZZIUS not being able to
detect the assertion failure. Next, we compare CONFUZZIUS
to ILF. CONFUZZIUS detects more block dependency vulnera-
bilities than ILF and reports no false positives on unprotected
selfdestruct vulnerabilities. The former is because ILF does
not consider block dependency on self-destructs. The latter
is because ILF considers transactions as malicious, even if it
is a benign user that sets the attacker as the destination of
a self-destruct. Fig. 8 in Appendix E, illustrates the length
of transactions per vulnerabilities found by CONFUZZIUS.
Although most vulnerabilities were found through one single
transaction, about 48% of the vulnerabilities were found
through a combination of at least two transactions.
Comparing to Symbolic Executors. In Fig. 7, we see that
symbolic execution tools produce a lot more false positives
than fuzzers. This is because fuzzers such as CONFUZZIUS
execute the program with concrete values, and false positives
TABLE III
INSTRUCTION COVERAGE COMPARISON BETWEEN CONFUZZIUS AND
SYMBOLIC EXECUTION TOOLS.
BID OYENTE MYTHRIL MANTICORE CONFUZZIUS
1 2749.0 8880.0 1840.0 3085.0
2 3841.0 0.0 0.0 4936.0
3 3618.0 0.0 0.0 4562.0
4 3953.0 0.0 0.0 5052.5
5 3731.0 0.0 0.0 4635.5
6 2175.0 2628.0 2502.0 2330.0
7 1107.0 1520.0 1457.0 1587.0
8 2444.0 2160.0 2023.0 2561.0
9 2448.0 4099.0 3403.0 3627.0
10 4480.0 6154.0 4121.0 6728.0
11 5403.0 6115.0 2797.0 8856.0
12 3006.0 4818.0 3547.0 4263.0
13 2477.0 3510.0 2759.0 3394.0
14 5495.0 5808.0 0.0 3763.0
15 3935.0 5723.0 3821.0 5086.5
16 737.0 549.0 738.0 505.0
17 2550.0 3044.0 0.0 3072.0
18 2147.0 2176.0 0.0 2419.0
19 2059.0 5340.0 2172.0 3325.0
20 2026.0 3231.0 2210.0 3157.0
21 358.0 446.0 441.0 447.0
22 1164.0 1311.0 1025.0 1309.0
23 1988.0 1725.0 0.0 2109.0
24 610.0 942.0 480.0 939.0
25 1305.0 1350.0 1258.0 1347.0
26 2758.0 2794.0 1855.0 4486.0
27 5553.0 7299.0 4070.0 7752.0
Median 2745.0 3023.0 1575.0 3531.0
are not possible, assuming that the implemention of the
detectors is correct. Besides, we see that CONFUZZIUS detects
more vulnerabilities than the analyzed symbolic execution
tools, with zero false positives. This is because CONFUZZIUS
often achieves high code coverage, and in some cases more
than symbolic execution tools.
Result. CONFUZZIUS detects more vulnerabilities than current
state-of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic execution tools with
significantly less false positives.
D. Threats to Validity
We identified threats to both, internal and external validity,
due to the choice of the benchmark. We chose HARVEY’s
benchmark [41] from the necessity to compare CONFUZZIUS
to HARVEY. However, we detected inconsistencies in the
number of executed instructions and the number of total in-
structions. This might be due to different initial states used by
CONFUZZIUS and HARVEY, which results in different results.
In addition, HARVEY’s benchmark might not be sufficiently
generalizable. For instance, the DAO version included in the
benchmark is not affected by the reentrancy attack. Therefore,
we will publicly disclose the entire benchmark, seeds, and the
initial state that we used for our experiments, in order to allow
for the reproducibility of our results.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since its introduction by Miller et al. [25], practitioners
applied fuzzing to many different and heterogeneous targets.
Software Fuzzing. KLEE [4] is a white-box fuzzer, which
executes the target code within a virtual environment and forks
this every time it finds a branch, in an attempt to explore all
paths. SAGE [12] uses a record&replay framework to negate
one of the logical conditions across a path and generates
new inputs to explore different paths. American Fuzzy Loop
(AFL) [24], one of the most widespread fuzzers, is based
on evolutionary fuzzing and exploits execution data to guide
the generation/mutation of fuzzed inputs. AFLFast [3] models
the probability of fuzzing an input with a Markov chain.
AFLGo [2] is a directed fuzzing solution that generates inputs
to reach a given set of target program locations efficiently.
Besides AFL and its offsprings, other fuzzers use evolutionary
approaches to generate test inputs automatically. VUzzer [30]
uses an application-aware evolutionary strategy by exploiting
static analysis and dynamic taint analysis. Driller [35] is a
hybrid fuzzer that leverages selective concolic execution in a
complementary manner, triggering it only when the fuzzer has
difficulties in exploring further the input space. Chizpurfle [16]
is an evolutionary fuzzing approach that targets service APIs
and introduces the concept of community, enabling the con-
current evolution of populations with individuals physically
located in the same target but impossible to combine due to
syntactic constraints.
Smart Contract Fuzzing. The first to propose a fuzzer for
smart contracts were Jiang et al. [17]. CONTRACTFUZZER
generates inputs based on the ABI. While their fuzzer uses
a custom Ethereum testnet, CONFUZZIUS directly emulates
the blockchain using an implementation of the EVM. Also,
CONFUZZIUS does not only make use of random values, but
also analyzes the execution traces (i.e. the list of executed
instructions together with information about the stack) to feed
a constraint solver and learn new values specific to the contact
under test. ECHIDNA [8] is a property-based testing tool for
grammar-based fuzzing. Wu¨stholz et al. propose HARVEY
[41], a fuzzer that makes use of a novel method for predicting
new inputs based on instruction-granularity cost metrics. CON-
FUZZIUS, however, exploits light symbolic execution on the
execution traces when the population fitness does not increase
(see Section IV-D). HARVEY fuzzes transaction sequences in
a targeted and demand-driven way, assisted by an aggressive
mode that directly fuzzes the persistent state of a smart
contract. CONFUZZIUS relies instead on the read-after-write
principle of data dependencies to guide the crossover operator
to create meaningful transaction sequences efficiently (see
Section IV-B). ILF [14] is a smart contract fuzzer based on
imitation learning. It introduces a learning phase prior to the
fuzzing phase. ILF consists of a neural network that is trained
on transactions obtained by running a symbolic execution
expert over a broad set of contracts. Instead, CONFUZZIUS
does not have the overhead of the learning phase and uses on-
demand constraint solving while actively fuzzing the target.
Smart Contract Symbolic Execution. Apart from fuzzing,
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Fig. 7. Comparison of detected vulnerabilities between CONFUZZIUS and other security tools.
several other automated tools for assessing the security of
smart contract were proposed. Luu et al. present OYENTE [22],
the first symbolic execution tool for Ethereum smart contracts.
OYENTE can automatically detect vulnerability patterns, such
as transaction order dependency and reentrancy. Nikolic et
al. present MAIAN [27], a tool that employs inter-procedural
symbolic analysis as well as concrete validation to find and
validate vulnerabilities on trace properties of Ethereum smart
contracts. Mueller et al. present MYTHRIL [26], a security
analysis tool for Ethereum smart contracts. It uses concolic
analysis, taint analysis and control-flow checking to detect
a variety of security vulnerabilities. Torres et al. propose
OSIRIS [36], a tool based on OYENTE that focuses on detect-
ing integer related bugs, such as integer overflows. It combines
symbolic execution and taint analysis in order to reduce the
number of false positives.
Smart Contract Static Analysis. Besides, symbolic execu-
tion, other works based on static analysis were proposed.
Kalra et al. propose ZEUS [18], a framework for automated
verification of smart contracts using abstract interpretation and
model checking, accepting user-provided policies. ZEUS in-
serts policy predicates as assert statements in the source code,
then translates the source code into an intermediate LLVM
representation, and finally invokes its verifier to determine
assertion violations. Tsankov et al. present SECURIFY [37], a
tool that uses static analysis based on a contract’s dependency
graph to extract semantic information about the program
bytecode and then check for violations of safety patterns. To
remain flexible, the tool permits new patterns to be specified
via a designated domain-specific language. Finally, Kolluri et
al. present ETHRACER [20], a tool that, similar to our work,
uses a hybrid approach. However, the authors employ the
opposite of our strategy, by primarily using concolic execution
to test a smart contract and using fuzzing only for producing
combinations of transactions to detect vulnerabilities such as
transaction order dependency. CONFUZZIUS’s fuzzing strategy
is more efficient than ETHRACER’s strategy, because it is not
completely random but rather based on read-after-write data
dependencies between transactions, yielding faster and more
efficient combinations of transaction order dependencies.
VII. CONCLUSION
We presented CONFUZZIUS, a novel hybrid fuzzer that
solves the three main challenges of smart contract testing.
The key idea is to model not only transactions but also
the execution environment, and combine the characteristics
of evolutionary fuzzing with data dependency analysis and
on-demand constraint solving to generate meaningful trans-
action sequences that get past complex conditions. We run
CONFUZZIUS against a benchmark of real-world smart con-
tracts [41], and showed that it detects significantly more
vulnerabilities and achieves more code coverage than state-
of-the-art fuzzers and symbolic execution tools for smart
contracts. In future work, we plan to extend the evaluation to
a large scale blockchain analysis and improve code coverage
by dealing with transaction sequences that require consistent
input values.
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APPENDIX
A. Vulnerability Detectors
We elaborate on the implementation details of our 11 vulner-
ability detectors below.
Arbitrary Memory Access. We make use if our symbolic
taint flow analysis to detect arbitrary memory access. We
check if the execution trace contains an SSTORE instruc-
tion where its two arguments, storage index and storage
value, are directly addressable via function arguments. This
is achieved by checking if symbolic values originating from
CALLDATALOAD flow into both arguments of SSTORE.
Assertion Failure. We detect an assertion failure by checking
TABLE IV
INSTRUCTION COVERAGE COMPARISON BETWEEN CONFUZZIUS AND ILF.
BID ILF CONFUZZIUS Ratio p-value AILF,CONFUZZIUS ACONFUZZIUS,ILF Total
1 3154 3085.0 0.80 <0.001 0.79 0.21 8899
2 4139.0 4936.0 1.23 <0.001 0.00 1.00 5212
3 3759.0 4562.0 1.31 <0.001 0.00 1.00 4767
4 4121.0 5052.5 1.34 <0.001 0.00 1.00 5335
5 3859.0 4635.5 1.32 <0.001 0.00 1.00 4890
6 1936.0 2330.0 1.20 <0.001 0.00 1.00 2631
7 1587.0 1587.0 1.04 <0.001 0.50 0.50 1658
8 2273.0 2561.0 1.16 <0.001 0.00 1.00 2934
9 2905.0 3627.0 1.05 <0.001 0.00 1.00 4109
10 5793.0 6728.0 0.91 <0.001 0.00 1.00 7659
11 7577.5 8856.0 1.02 <0.001 0.00 1.00 10493
12 3854.0 4263.0 0.83 <0.001 0.00 1.00 5237
13 2573.0 3394.0 0.75 <0.001 0.00 1.00 3720
14 4292.0 3763.0 0.81 <0.001 1.00 0.00 6735
15 5278.0 5086.5 1.00 <0.001 0.92 0.08 6208
16 498.0 505.0 1.02 <0.001 0.00 1.00 752
17 3062.0 3072.0 1.12 <0.001 0.17 0.83 3077
18 2368.0 2419.0 0.83 <0.001 0.00 1.00 2715
19 2608.0 3325.0 1.27 <0.001 0.00 1.00 6185
20 3043.0 3157.0 1.05 <0.001 0.00 1.00 3243
21 447.0 447.0 1.03 <0.001 0.50 0.50 448
22 1302.0 1309.0 1.03 <0.001 0.00 1.00 1317
23 2028.5 2109.0 1.01 <0.001 0.00 1.00 2379
24 693.0 939.0 1.25 <0.001 0.00 1.00 946
25 910.0 1347.0 1.13 <0.001 0.00 1.00 1351
26 4449.0 4486.0 2.79 <0.001 0.14 0.86 5034
27 6893.0 7752.0 1.41 <0.001 0.00 1.00 8492
Median 3163.0 3531.0 1.14 4312
if the execution trace contains an ASSERTFAIL or INVALID
instruction.
Integer Overflow. Detecting integer overflows is not trivial,
since not every overflow is considered harmful. We only
consider an overflow as harmful, if it modifies the state of the
smart contract, i.e. if the result of the computation is written
to storage or used to send funds. We follow the approach by
Torres et al. [36] and start by analyzing if the execution trace
contains an ADD, MUL or SUB instruction. We then extract the
operands from the stack and use these to compute the result
of the arithmetic operation ourselves. Afterwards, we check
if our result is equivalent to the result that has been pushed
onto the stack. If they are not equivalent, then we know that
an integer overflow has occurred and we keep track of the
overflow by tainting the result of the computation. We report
an integer overflow if the tainted result flows into an SSTORE
instruction or a CALL instruction.
Reentrancy. A reentrancy occurs whenever a contract calls
another contract, and that contract calls back the original con-
tract. We detect reentrancy by first checking if the execution
trace contains a CALL instruction whose gas value is larger
than 2300 and where the amount of funds to be transferred
depends on an SLOAD instruction. We then report a reentrancy
if we find an SSTORE instruction that occurs after the CALL
instruction and which shares the same storage location as the
SLOAD instruction.
Transaction Order Dependency. We detect transaction order
dependency by checking if there are two execution traces with
different senders, where the first execution trace writes to the
same storage location from which the second execution trace
reads.
Block Dependency. We detect a block dependency by check-
ing if the execution trace contains either a CREATE, CALL,
DELEGATECALL, or SELFDESTRUCT instruction, that is
either control-flow or data dependent on a BLOCKHASH,
COINBASE, TIMESTAMP, NUMBER, DIFFICULTY, or
GASLIMIT instruction.
Unhandled Exception. We detect unhandled exceptions by
first checking if the execution trace contains a CALL instruc-
tion that pushes the value 1 as a result after the call to the
stack. A value of 1 means that an error occurred during the
call (i.e. an exception). Afterwards, we check if the result of
the call flows into a JUMPI instruction. If it does not flow
until the end of the execution trace, then this means that
the exception of the call was not handled and we report an
unhandled exception.
Unsafe Delegatecall. We detect an unsafe delegate call
by checking if there is an execution trace that contains a
DELEGATECALL instruction and terminates with a STOP
instruction, but whose sender is an attacker address. Attacker
and non-attacker addresses are generated at the start by the
fuzzer.
Leaking Ether. We detect the leaking of ether by checking
if the execution trace contains a CALL instruction, whose
recipient is an attacker address, that has never sent ether to the
contract in a previous transaction or has never been passed as
a parameter in a function by a address that is not an attacker.
Locking Ether. We detect the locking of ether by checking
if a contract can receive ether but cannot send out ether. To
check if a contract cannot send ether, we check if the runtime
bytecode of the contract does not contain any CREATE, CALL,
DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT instruction. To check
if a contact can receive ether, we check if the execution trace
has a transaction value larger than 0, and terminates with a
STOP instruction.
Unprotected Selfdestruct. Similar to the leaking ether or
unsafe delegatecall vulnerability detectors, this detector relies
on attacker accounts. We detect an unprotected selfdestruct by
checking if the execution trace contains a SELFDESTRUCT
instruction and its sender is an attacker.
B. HARVEY Benchmark
TABLE V
OVERVIEW OF THE HARVEY BENCHMARK.
BIDs Name Func. LoSC Description
1 ENS 24 1205 ENS domain name auction
2-3 CMSW 49 503 ConsenSys multisig wallet
4-5 GMSW 49 704 Gnosis multisig wallet
6 BAT 23 191 BAT token (advertising)
7 CT 12 200 ConsenSys token library
8 ERCF 19 747 ERC Fund (investment fund)
9 FBT 34 385 FirstBlood token (e-sports)
10-13 HPN 173 3065 Havven payment network
14 MR 25 1053 MicroRaiden payment service
15 MT 38 437 MOD token (supply-chain)
16 PC 7 69 Payment channel
17-18 RNTS 49 749 Request Network token sale
19 DAO 23 783 The DAO organization
20 VT 18 242 Valid token (personal data)
21 USCC1 4 57 USCC17 entry
22 USCC2 14 89 USCC17 (honorable mention)
23 USCC3 21 535 USCC17 (3rd place)
24 USCC4 7 164 USCC17 (1st place)
25 USCC5 10 188 USCC17 (2nd place)
26 PW 19 549 Parity multisig wallet
27 BNK 44 649 Bankera token
Total 662 12564
C. Copeland Method
TABLE VI
COPELAND WINNERS FOR EACH PAIRWISE COMPARISON.
Comparison Result Winner
OYENTE vs. MYTHRIL 7 vs. 20 MYTHRIL
OYENTE vs. MANTICORE 17 vs. 10 OYENTE
OYENTE vs. CONFUZZIUS 2 vs. 25 CONFUZZIUS
MYTHRIL vs. MANTICORE 22 vs. 1 MYTHRIL
MYTHRIL vs. CONFUZZIUS 13 vs. 14 CONFUZZIUS
MANTICORE vs. CONFUZZIUS 2 vs. 25 CONFUZZIUS
D. Copeland Ranking
TABLE VII
RANKING BETWEEN CONFUZZIUS AND SYMBOLIC EXECUTORS.
Toolname Victories Defeats Result Ranking
OYENTE 1 2 -1 3rd
MYTHRIL 2 1 1 2nd
MANTICORE 0 3 -3 4th
CONFUZZIUS 3 0 3 1st
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F. Instruction Coverage Between CONFUZZIUS and ILF
